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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly construe the property descriptions of the
parties' relevant deeds?
Standard of appellate review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the
trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed for
correctness. White v. Gary L. Deeselhorst NP Ski Corp.. 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah
1

1994).
Issue 2: Did the trial court correctly quiet title and declare judgment as a matter of
law in the Wards?
Standard of appellate review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the
trial court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed for
correctness. White. 879 P.2d at 1374.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The parties are neighbors, Mr. Khalsa to the East and the Wards to the

West. The parties' common predecessor-in-interest is a man named Ellsworth, who
conveyed directly to the Wards the parcel of land they now own by Warranty Deed which
was recorded by the Wards on April 15, 1987. Mr. Khalsa's parcel of land also came
from Mr. Ellsworth, but was conveyed through a number of intermediate owners before
Mr. Khalsa bought it and recorded a Warranty Deed on June 1, 1999.
Mr. Khalsa asserts that the property line dividing his parcel from the Wards' parcel
runs just West of a ditch that generally parallels the dividing line between the properties,
and thus Mr. Khalsa's parcel of property includes the ditch. The Wards maintain that the
ditch (or some part of it) is the Western property line based on the phrase "along a ditch"
contained in the legal description of their parcel.
2

After the boundary dispute arose, Mr. Khalsa hired a surveyor to survey the
property line diving the two properties according to the metes and bounds of the legal
descriptions of the parties' Warranty Deeds. The survey confirmed that the ditch is not
the dividing line between the two parcels of property, but is actually contained within Mr.
Khalsa's property.
B.

Proceedings Below
Mr. Khalsa initiated this action by filing a Complaint to which the Wards answered

and filed a Counterclaim. Mr. Khalsa subsequently filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Wards responded with a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr.
Khalsa files the instant appeal from the Trial Court's decision on these summary
judgment motions.
C.

Material Facts
1. The parties own neighboring parcels of property in Wasatch County, Utah. (R

at 70,11.)
2. The parties' parcels of property come from the same predecessor-in-interest, a
man named Ellsworth. (R at 70,12.)
3. Mr. Khalsa's parcel of property at issue herein was conveyed from Mr.
Ellsworth through a number of intermediate owners before Mr. Khalsa bought it and
recorded a Warranty Deed on it in June of 1999. (R at 70,13; 73-74.) A copy of Mi*.
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Khalsa's Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4. The Wards' parcel of property at issue herein was conveyed by Mr. Ellsworth
directly to them by Warranty Deed recorded April 15, 1987. (R at 76.) A copy of the
Wards' Warranty Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5. Mr. Khalsa's parcel of property is legally described as follows:
COMMENCING at a point having State Plane Rectangular Coordinates of
X:2003075.02 and Y:786473.28 (based on the Lambert Conformal
Projection, Utah Central Zone), said point also being North 6.9 feet
and East 359.94 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 3, Township 4
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
07°54f36,! East 680.8 feet; thence North 89°24'37?f East 589.39 feet;
thence South 676.05 feet' thence South 89°41'08" West 692.05 feet to
the point of beginning.
(Rat 73-74.)
6. The Wards' parcel of property is described as follows:
Commencing at a point located South 13.88 feet (4.23 meters) and West
2320.67 (707.34 meters) from the South one-quarter corner of
Section 3, Township 4 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
Thence South 89°55'45n West along a fence line 361.52 feet (110.19 meters);
thence North 00°09,22n East along a fence line 674.12 feet (205.47 meters);
thence North 89°55f01" East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters);
thence South 07°54'36" West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to
the point of beginning.
(Rat 76.)
7. A licensed surveyor, Bing Christensen, surveyed the disputed piece of land in a
survey dated November 11, 2001. (R at 83, ^f 3.) This survey is not in dispute.

4

8. In plotting the boundary between the parties' properties, Mr. Christensen used
the legal description from the parties warranty deeds. (R at 83,14.)
9. More recently, Mr. Christensen plotted the Khalsa and Ward properties
(according to the legal descriptions in their respective warranty deeds), as well as the
ditch in question. (R at 83, Yl 5-7; 78.) This plot is not in dispute. A copy of said plot is
attached hereto as Exhibit C.
10. According to Mr. Christensen's survey and plot, the boundary between the
Ward and Khalsa properties, based on the metes and bounds in the legal descriptions of
their warranty deeds, is approximately 10-20 feet west of the ditch in question. (R at 83,

118.)
11. The Wards' Warranty Deed expressly states that the area they received was
6.31 acres. (Rat76.)
12. The surveyor calculated the acreage of the Wards' property from the legal
description in their warranty deeds as 6.306 acres (excluding the disputed parcel) which is
identical (when rounded up) to the 6.31 acres stated in the Wards' warranty deed. (R at
207.)
14. The acreage of the disputed parcel is .58 acres. (R at 78.)
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred below when it granted the Wards' Cross-Motion for

5

Summary Judgment, thereby quieting title in the disputed land to the Wards. The Trial
Court erred in that it ignored the intent of the predecessor-in-interest as contained in the
parties' warranty deeds, and it used incorrect cannons of construction in construing said
warranty deeds. In the alternative, disputed issues of fact exist regarding the intent of the
predecessor-in-interest in conveying his land to the parties, thereby making the Trial
Court's award of summary judgment improper.
V. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUIETING TITLE AND DECLARING
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE WARDS, AND IN NOT QUIETING
TITLE AND DECLARING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MR. KHALSA
The Trial Court ruled in its Memorandum Decision (R at 225-232; a copy of which

is attached hereto as Exhibit D) that title be quieted in the Wards to the disputed piece of
land based on the language "along a ditch" which, the Trial Court held, governs this
dispute. The Trial Court concluded that the ditch was the correct boundary in both the
legal descriptions in the parties' two warranty deeds. However, the Trial Court erred in
that (1) it ignored the intent of the grantor of the two warranty deeds, and (2) applied the
incorrect cannon of construction.

6

1.

When the Face of a Deed Shows the Intention Was to Convey a Specific
Quantity of Land and the Metes and Bounds Would Give That
Quantity, but a Reference to a Monument Would Embrace More or
less than That Quantity, the Metes and Bounds Description Should Be
Followed

The polar star rule in construing deeds is that the Court should effectuate the
grantor's intent. Thompson on Real Property § 82.13(a)(3); see also, Hartman v. Potter,
596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) (holding that the object of construction is to ascertain
intention of the parties, "especially that of grantor"). Determining the grantor's intent
precedes application of the various cannons of construction used to construe deeds. Id.;
see also, 1-8 Disputes-Adjoining Landowners § 8.02; 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 61
(quoted below); Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 252 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. 1952). In fact, if
the Court can determine the intent of the grantor, an analysis of the cannons of
construction is unnecessary. Thompson on Real Property § 82.13(b).
The best indicator of the parties' common grantor-in-interest, Mr. Ellsworth is the parties'
Warranty Deeds. The legal description to the Wards' Warranty Deed states:
Commencing at a point located South 13.88 feet (4.23 meters) and West
2320.67 (707.34 meters) from the South one-quarter corner of
Section 3, Township 4 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
Thence South 89055'45" West along a fence line 361.52 feet (110.19 meters);
thence North 00°09'22" East along a fence line 674.12 feet (205.47 meters);
thence North 89°55f01n East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters);
thence South 07°54'36" West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to
the point of beginning.
The legal description in Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed states:
7

COMMENCING at a point having State Plane Rectangular Coordinates of
X:2003075.02 and Y:786473.28 (based on the Lambert Conformal
Projection, Utah Central Zone), said point also being North 6.9 feet
and East 359.94 feet from the Southwest corner of Section 3, Township 4
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
07°54'36" East 680.8 feet; thence North 89°24'37n East 589.39 feet;
thence South 676.05 feet5 thence South 89°41f08" West 692.05 feet to
the point of beginning.
Mr. Khalsa hired a surveyor to survey both properties' according to the above legal
descriptions so as to accurately plot the boundary between the parties' properties, as well
as the ditch in question. In performing the survey, the surveyor relied solely on the metes
and bounds of the legal descriptions contained in the parties' warranty deeds. According
to said survey, the boundary dividing the Khalsa and Ward properties runs just West of
the ditch by about 10-20 feet. In fact, ignoring the words "along a ditch" (found only in
the Wards' legal description), the legal descriptions of the parties' common border - as
conveyed to them by their common predecessor - is identical. The ditch, then, is not the
intended boundary between the parties' properties according to the legal descriptions in
the parties' warranty deeds. The survey thus validates Mr. Khalsa's contention that the
metes and bounds in the legal description of both parties'warranty deeds correctly
describes their predecessor's intent and the boundary between their properties.
Further evidence of the Mr. Ellsworth's intent is found in the Wards' Warranty
Deed which expressly states that the area conveyed by their Warranty Deed was 6.31
acres. However, when the surveyor plotted the legal description from the Wards'
8

Warranty Deed, he calculated their acreage at 6.306 which is identical (when rounded off)
to the 6.31 acres stated in the Wards5 warranty deed. This amount does not include the
disputed parcel because the surveyor used the metes and bounds from the Wards5
Warranty Deed to plot their piece of property. According to the surveyor, the acreage of
the disputed parcel is .58 acres - more than half an acre. Adding this disputed acreage to
the acreage conveyed by the Wards5 Warranty Deed yields 6.886 acres that the Trial
Court has awarded to the Wards. However, on the face of the Wards5 Warranty Deed,
Mr. Ellsworth only conveyed 6.31 acres to them. As the Utah Supreme Court held in
Neelevv. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979), "[w]hen the face of a deed shows the
intention was to convey a specific quantity of land and the metes and bounds would give
that quantity, but a reference to a monument would embrace more or less than that
quantity, the metes and bounds description should be followed.55 The Trial Court,
however, did not do this.
In sum, focusing first and solely on the intent of the prior grantor and the Wards5
Warranty Deed, the Wards only received land circumscribed by the metes and bounds
description in their Warranty Deed, which necessarily excluded the disputed piece of land
related to the ditch.
2.

The Trial Court Erred in its Application of Cannons of Construction

Although the Trial Court below held that the phrase "along a ditch55 was a call to a
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monument which governs over the metes and bounds of a legal description, this
construction of the Wards' Warranty Deed ignores Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed and more
applicable cannons of construction.
One such cannon of construction holds that a specific description will control over
a general description:
Plaintiff maintains that the specific metes and bounds description controls over the
general language of the exception clause, relying on Neeley v. Kelsch for that
proposition. Neeley does in fact follow the well-recognized rule that a specific
description will control or limit a general description.
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). The
Utah Supreme Court similarly held in Neeley, 600 P.2d at 982:
While Kelsch may have first recorded their deed and their deed contained a general
description of 'all land lying north of the County Road,' their metes and bounds
description did not include the disputed land, nor was all land north of the County
Road conveyed infra. The specific description in chains and degrees prevails over
the general references to the location of a boundary. Also, when the face of a
deed shows the intention was to convey a specific quantity of land and the metes
and bounds would give that quantity, but a reference to a monument would
embrace more or less than that quantity9 the metes and bounds description
should be followed.
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, common law provides exceptions to the monumentgoverns-over-metes-and-bounds cannon. The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision
ignored the following such exceptions:
Where the calls for the location of boundaries to land are inconsistent, other things
being equal, resort is to be had first to natural objects or landmarks, next to
artificial monuments, then to adjacent boundaries (which are considered a sort of
10

monument), and thereafter to courses and distances. Where, however, it is
apparent that a mistake exists with respect to the calls, an inferior means of
location may control a higher one. In the last analysis the call adopted as the
controlling one should be that most inconsistent with the apparent intent of the
grantor.1
12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 61 (emphasis added). Further, 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries §
64 contains other exceptions pertinent to the case at bar:
Courses and distances and other inferior calls may control monuments and natural
objects in cases of clear mistake, where the calls for monuments are inconsistent
with each other, or where some other sufficient reason exists for disregarding
the general rule, as where it is apparent from the instrument that boundaries are
to be determined by means of location other than the monument, or where the
location of the monuments is uncertain.
* * *

The doctrine that monuments prevail over courses and distances is never adhered
to where it would lead to an absurdity or where it would defeat a grant when, by
rejecting a call for one or more monuments, the deed may be upheld and the
manifest intent of the parties made effectual.
(Emphasis added). In the case at bar (and as discussed above), the face of both parties'
warranty deeds shows the intention of their common grantor to convey the parties'
respective adjoining parcels with a common border running in a straight, somewhat
diagonal line as specifically described by the metes and bounds of their warranty deeds.
Such intent makes the phrase "along a ditch" extraneous and irrelevant. 12 Am. Jur. 2d

1

The highlighted portion of this section of Am. Jur. specifically cites to the Utah
Supreme Court case, Neelev (as well as cases from other jurisdictions).
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Boundaries § 62 provides that courts can reject or disregard extraneous calls:
In determining boundaries of a tract of land, it is not permissible to disregard any
of the calls if they can be applied and harmonized in any reasonable manner, but if
there is an actual contradiction between calls in the description of land, so that
they are irreconcilable, the court may reject or disregard the one which is false
or mistaken.
* * *

And an inconsistent call should be discarded if thereby all the rest of the calls are
reconciled and the description perfected.2
(Emphasis added). In fact, another cannon of construction applicable in this case states,
"Useless or contradictory words may be disregarded as mere surpluses." J. Cribbet,
Principles of the Law of Property, at 170 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 1975); see also, 1481A Powell on Real Property at 81A.05[3][f]. Thus, if one were to delete the phrase
"along a ditch" from the legal description in the Wards' Warranty Deed, the boundary
between the parties' properties lines up perfectly along a common boundary that runs 1520 feet West of (and generally parallel to) the ditch according to the metes and bounds in
the legal descriptions of the parties' properties as depicted in their respective warranty
deeds and the most recent survey and plot. Just as the Neeley court ignored the
extraneous phrase "all land lying north of the County Road" contained in the legal
description to the defendant's property, the Trial Court below failed to ignore the words

2

This proposition from 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 62 also relies on Neeley and
other jurisdictions.
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"along a ditch55 contained in the Wards5 Warranty Deed.
The Court in Borough v. Borough, 422 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1979)
applied the above exception to facts closely related to the case at bar. In Borough, the
charter of a borough named Laflin contained a legal description of a number of lots,
concerning which "there would be no dispute because this description can be plotted
fairly accurately.55 Id at 1187 (citation omitted). However, the Laflin charter also
contains:
'a call for the northeastern boundary of Laflin to adjoin the southwestern boundary
of Yatesville. If this call is respected, the remaining parts of the description cannot
be satisfied inasmuch as the total acreage of Laflin would increase, and three
segments of the metes and bounds description would be altered by several hundred
feet each.5
Id. (Citation omitted). The Borough court held:
'An inferior call will prevail where absurd consequences might ensue by giving
controlling influence to a superior call, or where a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances shows the inferior call to be more reliable or certain, or where the
superior call was inserted by mistake or inadvertence. [Citation omitted] In any
event, the call adopted as the controlling one should be the [m]ost consistent with
the apparent intent of the parties. [Citation omitted]5
Id. Thus, in the present case, "along a ditch55 is extraneous language unintended by the
common grantor, and is governed by the cannons of construction that discard extraneous
language and that hold specific metes and bounds of the parties5 warranty deeds govern of
general calls to land. The Trial Court thus erred in quieting title based on the words
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"along a ditch" contained in the Wards' Warranty Deed.
a-

If the Words "along a ditch" Govern this Dispute, Neither of the
Warranty Deeds5 Legal Descriptions Would Be Able to "close"

In reviewing the metes and bounds of the parties' legal descriptions quoted above,
the bearing for the common boundary is 07°54'36M which is the same for both parcels of
property. The only difference with this bearing is that in the legal description in the
Wards' Warranty Deed, the bearing is South; in Mr. Khalsa's legal description, the
bearing is North.
Furthermore, according to the metes and bounds of the parties' legal descriptions,
the length of the common border between the two parcels in question is exactly 680.8
feet. If the words "along a ditch" is deleted, nothing changes. The bearings and distance
are still in agreement. Thus, "along a ditch" is extraneous and does not affect the bearing
and distance of the common border.
On the other hand, concluding that the common border literally tracks "along the
ditch" as the Wards claim, would not only contradict the straight line and specific
distance in the Wards' legal description, but would vitiate the identical bearing and
distance in Mr. Khalsa's legal description, resulting in the two legal descriptions being
unable to "close."
In order for the two legals to "close," the only possible reading of "along a ditch"
(so as to harmonize it with the otherwise identical bearings and distances of the common
14

boundary) is to interpret "along a ditch" to mean that the common boundary described by
the identical bearings and distances in the two legals generally follows along the line of
the ditch. To hold otherwise would require the Court to reform Khalsa's warranty deed
by adding "along a ditch" into his legal description, or to vitiate the identical bearings and
distances in the legal descriptions to the parties5 warranty deeds.
b.

Alternatively, Issues of Fact Exist Regarding the Intent of the
Parties and the Common Grantor-in-interest So as to Preclude
the Trial Court's Award of Summary Judgment

In the alternative, if the Court does not hold as a matter of law that the Trial Court
incorrectly awarded summary judgment to the Wards and should have awarded summary
judgment on the quiet title claim to Mr. Khalsa, then issues of fact exist as to the intent of
the parties, as well as their common grantor-in-interest, Mr. Ellsworth. "Deeds are to be
construed like other written instruments, and where a deed is plain and unambiguous,
parol evidence is admissible to determine the parties' intent. Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656.
In Plateau Mining Company v. Utah State Division of Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720,
725 (Utah 1990), the court noted that where ambiguity exists in a contract, the intent of
the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Finally, "Where, as
here, the court has determined that the contract is ambiguous and there are issues of fact
regarding the intention of the parties, summary judgment may not be granted based on
contract interpretation." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 928 (Utah 2002).
15

Accordingly, if the Court is unable to interpret the intent of the common grantorin-interest based on the Warranty Deeds, and thereby reverse the Trial Court's ruling and
quiet title in the disputed land in favor of Mr. Khalsa, then material issues of fact exist
such that preclude the Trial Court's award of summary judgment to the Wards.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CASELAW SUPPORT IS INAPPLICABLE TO
THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS AT ISSUE IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE
The Trial Court relied on Mahas v. Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990) in

support of its reform and vitiate Memorandum Decision. A critical difference between
Mahas and the present case is that in Mahas, "The two properties are physically separated
by an old fence, which expert witnesses determined ran along the line of a canal which is
called to in the legal descriptions contained in the vesting deeds of both plaintiffs and
defendant,.. ." IcL at 1025. Thus, both parties in Mahas possessed deeds that contained
a reference to a canal. Compare this with the legal descriptions in the two warranty deeds
in the present case - the legal description in Mr. Khalsa's warranty deed contains no
reference to a ditch.
The second difference between Mahas and the present case is the legals. Compare
the reference in the Wards' Warranty Deed to the ditch (" . . . thence South 07°54f36"
West along a ditch 680.80 feet...") to the references in the two deeds in Mahas:
•

" . . . thence South 27 [degrees] West to Canal; thence Southeasterly along
said canal to a point North 15 [degrees] East 10.18 chains from County
16

Road .. " (Mahas plaintiff s deed) (emphasis added);
•

" . . . thence North 27 [degrees] East 12.00 chains, more or less to a canal;
thence Southeasterly along canal to a pointNorth 15 [degrees] East 10.18
chains from the County Road . . . " (Mahas defendant's deed) (emphasis
added).

If all references in these two Mahas deeds to the canal were deleted, the descriptions
would be incomplete and incomprehensible. In other words, the Mahas legal descriptions
clearly rely on the references to the canal; the Wards' legal description, however, can
stand independent of the reference to a ditch contained therein.
The Trial Court also relies on Williams v. Oldrovd. 581 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978) in
support of its Memorandum Decision. Williams, however, is also different from the
present case in that it was a dispute between a plaintiff-grantor who deeded a parcel to the
defendant-grantee. Thus, Williams involved one deed, not two, and so did not have the
benefit of a second legal description of the disputed common border such as is present in
the instant case. Moreover, the Williams court summarily concluded, without setting
forth the actual legal description at issue before it, that "A latent ambiguity in the deed
was discovered when the property was surveyed. One of the metes and bounds calls is in
conflict with a call to a monument." As can be observed in Mahas, a comparison between
the legal in Williams and the legals in the present case is critical to determine how similar
or different the monument references are. Accordingly, Williams is not only
distinguishable, but fails to provide sufficient information upon which an accurate
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comparison can be made to the present case.
The Trial Court further relies on Scott v. Hansen. 422 P.2d 525 (Utah 1966) in its
Memorandum Decision. However, just as with Mahas, Scott deals with references to a
county road in the legal descriptions of both the plaintiff and defendant's deeds, which is
not the case in the present action. Moreover, the Scott controversy centered around a
county road that "as it actually exists has always been a meandering road . . . , whereas, it
is shown on the county recorder's plat as a straight east-west line." Id at 527. Such a
controversy is not found in the present case.
Although Scott is distinguishable on its facts, it is actually helpful in its references
to a Texas Supreme Court case for the proposition that, "There are rules of construction
which have been adopted for the purpose of assisting in ascertaining and giving effect to
such intent." Id at 527. The reference in Scott supporting this proposition is to Stanolind
Oil and Gas Co.. 252 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. 1952), which holds:
The rules for the construction of grants and for ascertaining their boundaries,
which have from time to time been announced by the court and have been acted on
in establishing their lines, are all designed for the purpose of carrying out the
intention of the grantor. When this intention is once made manifest, all else
must yield to and be governed by it
(Emphasis added). Thus, the parties' intent (just as with any contractual interpretation
analysis) is the governing query for a court to make (as discussed above). The parties'
intent in the case at bar, when viewing the parties' legal descriptions clearly indicates that
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the common border follows along the identical bearing and distance found in both deeds.
In sum, none of Defendants' supporting caselaw advances their claims and are all
distinguishable on their facts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's decision by
quieting title and declaring judgment in favor of Mr. Khalsa. In the alternative, if the
Court is unable to make this determination, it should reverse the Trial Court's decision
and remand for further proceedings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 2004.

HILUJOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Stephen Quesenberry
J. Bryan Quesenberry
Attorneys for Appellant
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VII. APPENDIX

Exhibit A

Mr. Khalsa's Warranty Deed

Exhibit B

The Wards' Warranty Deed

Exhibit C

The surveyor's plot

Exhibit D

Memorandum Decision
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WARRANTY DEED
Martin G r a y b i l l J r . ,
of

T r u s t e e of the MARTIN B. GRAYBILL, J r . REVOCABLE TRUSTS

Midway

grantor
hereby

State of Utah

CONVEY S and WARRANT S to Mahan S i n g h Khalsa and Mahan Kaur Khalsa,

as j o i n t

tenants

grantee
of Midway

County

Wasatch

.Staleof | Utah

for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following described tract of land in
Wasatch

County, Stare of Utah

, to-wit:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT

!,

A"

PAGE (•) INDEX ( ) ABSTRACT ( )P L A T ^ H E C K ( ^

WITNESS the hand of said grantor

, this 28 th

day of

Signed in the presence of

STATE OF

May

Martir^ C ^ y b i l l

J*^

UTAH |

<ss.
COUNTY OF Wasatch

B.
On the 28 t h
day of May
A.D. 199 9 personally appeared before me M a r t i n I G r a y b i l l
J r . , T r u s t e e of the M a r t i n B. G r a y b i l l , J r , Revocable T r u s t

the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me (hat he

FITS/A-:.,«-*

.

,w

executed the same.

My CommissiorFCESepires:
'^

I

_3'coL—.Y"oany

f

Jlairnpin
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DESCRIPTION

CCZMEXCIttiS at a point having State Plane Rectangular Coordinates of
X:2003075.02 and Y.-786473.28 (based on the lambert Confonral
Projection, Utah Central Zone), s a i d point also being North 6.9 feet
and East 359.94 feet from the Southwest comer of Section 3, Township 4
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North
07°54'36" East 68Q.8 feet; thence North 89 0 24 , 37 ,, East 598.39 feet;
thence South 675.05 feet; thence South 89°4I'08 M West 692.05 feet to
the poinc of beginning.
TCGEIHER WITH and subject to the following described right-of-way:
Cocrrrencing a t a point having State Plane Rectangular Coordinates of
X-.2005365.02 and Y.786487.17 (based on the Lambert Conforral
Projection, Utah Central Zone}, said point also being West 30.0 feet
frcra the South one quarter corner of Section 3, Township 4 South, Range
4 East, S a l t Lake Base and Meridian, thence West 396,0 feet; thence
South 89°19'53" West 653.03
feet, thence South 89°41'08" West 1331.7
feet, thence North 07°54 / 36" East 32.33 feet; thence North 89°41'08'
East 1327.25 feet; thence North 89°19'53" East 563.03 feet, thence East
396.0 f e e t ; thence South 32.0 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with well application No, 58855
Together with 8 shares of Midway I r r i g a t i o n Company Water Stoc*.

0 0 2 1 4 0 &k Q0426 P* 00014

EXHIBIT "B"

Recorded at Request o:
at.

-fcL Fee Paid S_

by

—

Dep. Boole.

Mail tax notice tn ^CTr

. Page.
A^yw

\JJfKT<L

.Ref.i

H0^> S*< ? - ^ g 7>rwr*.yf \/Cb*k.z*\

WARRANTY DEED
of
CONVEY

Hoter S, E l l s w o r t h , a Married Man
grantor
Midway
- f County of
Wasatch
t state 01 Utah, herehv
*„ J e f f r e y Ward and J e n Q. Ward
a nriWAT?PiWT

S a l t Lake County
TEN DQIIASS

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

0f

the following1 described tract
State of Utah*

•($10,00)
of land in

Wasatch

County,

Corroencing a t a p o i n t l o c a t e d South 13.88 f e e t (4,23 meters) and West
2320.67 f e e t (707,34 ireters) from t h e South one-Kjuarter c o r n e r of
S e c t i o n 3, Township 4 South, Range 4 East", S a l t Lake Base and Meridian;
Thence South 89^55'45" West a l o n g a f e n c e l i n e 361,52 f e e t (110,13 i r e t e r s ) ?
t h e n c e North ccPQ9'22" E a s t along a f e n c e l i n e 674.12 f e e t ' (205.47 n a t e r s ) ;
t h e n c e North 89°55 T 01 tf E a s t a l o n g a f e n c e l i n e 453.38 ' f e e t (138,19 i n t e r s ) ;
thence^South. 0 7 ° 5 4 , 3 6 n West a l o n g a d i t c h 680,80 f e e t (207,51 i r e t e r s ) t o
t h e p o i n t of h e g i n n i n g ,
^rear-= 6.31 a c r e s (25,518,93 m e t e r s )

«scKii ^Jml^QJdM^^
BOOK J ^ ? M S - J 5 2 L
MS»5«fc«o&jiiiteissaa* xfi*iter VMIA*
P^lX)'NDEXl^JA8STWaiO)PW
WITNESS, the hand

'of 3aid grantor ' , this
C L ^ _ ^ _ ,A.B. 1 9

7

day of

^
^

Or
L

^r,fihit
V.

^frW

^OJJL^

Signed in the Presence of

J

<£ho

. » * * * • ' /,
STATE OF UTAH,
County of

/r/^so.--.^

On the
personally appeared before me

\^\
•. /

the signer
same-

of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

<^:i
2 /—
My commission a:cptres-_£"~ / x

/

^

v,j y

}. A.Qx 13> ^

V".3
her ....uV'
executed

^iJ(rri^.J.s&*

tr.

Noun-' Punlic.
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EXHIBIT "D"

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MAHANKHALSA,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
v.
JEFF WARD and JON Q. WARD,

Case No. 020500294

Defendants.
JEFFERY F. WARD and JON Q.
WARD,

Judge Donald J. Eyre

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
V.

MAHANKHALSA,
Counterclaim Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the file,
considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in
the premises, issues the following ruling.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1 Plaintiff and Defendants are the owners of adjacent parcels of real property located in
Midway, Utah.

2. At an earlier point in time, both parcels of real property were owned by Homer
Ellsworth ("Ellsworth").
3. Defendants purchased their parcel from Ellsworth on July 4, 1978 by means of a
Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract ("Ellsworth Contract"). A copy of the Ellsworth
Contract was recorded at the Wasatch County Recorder's Office on September 12, 1980. The
Ellsworth Contract described the parcel as follows:
Commencing at a point located South 13.88 feet (4.23 meters) and
West 2320.67 feet (707.34 meters) from the South one-quarter
corner of Section 3, Township 4 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence South 98°55'45M West along a fence line
361.52 feet (110.19 meters); thence North 00°09'22" East along a
fence line 674.12 feet (205.47 meters); thence North 89°55,01M
East along a fence line 453.38 feet (138.19 meters); thence South
07°54'36M West along a ditch 680.80 feet (207.51 meters) to the
point of beginning.
4. All parties acknowledge that the legal description referring to "along a ditch" has
reference to a large irrigation ditch known as the Epperson ditch. The ownership of the Epperson
ditch is disputed by the parties.
5. Since July 4, 1978, Defendants have occupied their property up to the western edge of
the Epperson ditch.
6. During the year 1990, Defendants constructed a fence along the western border of the
Epperson ditch. The fence remained undisturbed until May 2002, when Plaintiff removed the
fence without any prior warning or notice to Defendants.
7. The Ellsworth Contract also provided for 20 foot easement for ingress and egress over
Ellsworth's remaining tract of land ("the easement").
8. Defendant Jon Q. Ward has submitted an affidavit indicating that he has utilized the
easement on numerous occasions despite the efforts of previous owners to bar access to the
easement. In 1999, Plaintiff erected a barrier at the entrance of Stringtown Road that has
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prevented Defendants' access to the easement from the road.
9. Defendants recorded a warranty deed on their real property on April 15, 1987.
10. In June 1999, Plaintiff purchased his parcel of property and recorded a warranty deed
on it. The legal description of Plaintiff s parcel-is as follows:
Commencing at a point having State Plane rectangular Coordinates
of X:2003075.02 and Y:786473.28 (based on the Lambert
Conformal Projection, Utah Central Zone), said point also being
North 6.9 feet and East 359.94 feet from the Southwest corner of
Section 3, Township 4 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, thence North 07°54'36n East 680.8 feet; thence North
89°24'37M East 598.39 feet; thence South 676.05 feet; thence
South 89°4r08 M West 692.05 feet to the point of the beginning.
11. In November 2001, Plaintiff hired Brent Christensen to perform a land survey of
Plaintiffs property and Defendants5 property. According to Christensen's survey, the boundary
between the two properties, based on their legal descriptions, is approximately 10-20 feet west of
the Epperson ditch.
12 Plaintiff brought an action seeking to quiet title on the disputed property and
declaratory judgment on its causes of action and seeks a permanent injunction against Defendants
as well as damages for trespass to land and trespass to chattels.
13. Defendants filed a Counterclaim seeking judgment and an order quieting title on the
boundary of the disputed property as well as a judgment and order quieting title in the easement
over Plaintiffs property. In addition, Defendants bring an action for trespass and seek an order
enjoining Plaintiff from continued and threatened actions in violation of Defendants' alleged
property rights. Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to the property by virtue of
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
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ANALYSIS & RULING
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In applying this rule, the Utah Supreme
Court has indicated that, when considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and
inferences arising therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party
Winegarv. Froer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, "[t]he presence of a
dispute as to material facts disallows the granting of summary judgment." Bill Brown Realty, Inc.
v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977).

Quieting Title in the Disputed Boundary Line of the Property
Both Plaintiff and Defendants seek an order from the Court quieting title in the disputed
boundary line separating their respective tracts of real property. When Courts are asked to
interpret legal descriptions of real property, Utah case law is clear on the issue of whether
reference to a monument or marker will prevail over a conflicting metes and bounds description.
In the case of Mahas v. Rindlisbacher, the Utah Supreme Court noted u the well established rule
that in interpreting legal descriptions, a call to a monument or marker takes precedence over
courses and distances." 808 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Utah 1990) (citing Henrie v. Hyer, 92 Utah 530,
538, 70P.2d 154, 157 (1937); Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 Utah 108, 119, 80 P. 382, 386
(1905)). In an earlier decision, the Utah Supreme Court decided a case where "[a] latent
ambiguity in the deed was discovered when the property was surveyed. One of the metes and
bounds calls is in conflict with a call to a monument.... Where there is such ambiguity,
monument calls take precedence over calls of courses or distances." Williams v. Oldroyd, 581
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P.2d561 (Utah 1978) (citing Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966)). The Utah
Supreme Court explained the rationale for this rule as follows:
In a situation such as this where a dispute arises as to the boundary
between tracts conveyed to the patfies by a common grantor, it
becomes important to determine if possible the intent of the parties
at the time of the conveyance. There are rules of construction
which have been adopted for the purpose of assisting in ascertaining
and giving effect to such intent. One of these is that fixed
monuments or markers of a permanent nature which can be
definitely identified and located take precedence over calls of
courses or distances, or plats, or amounts of acreage. This is so
because it is reasonable to assume that the parties are more apt to
be familiar with such monuments or markers than with precise
measurements, or with recorder's plats; consequently, giving
precedence to the call to such a monument or marker results in less
possibility of error and a greater likelihood of giving effect to the
intent of the parties.
Scott v. Hansen, 422 P.2d 525, 527-528 (Utah 1966).

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, Utah case law establishes the
general rule that a reference to a monument will prevail over metes and bounds descriptions in a
deed. As the Scott case makes clear, this rule of construction has been established because the
parties are likely to be more familiar with identifiable markers or monuments than with precise
measurements. Id While Plaintiff does not dispute the language of Defendants' deed referencing
the boundary of the property as being "along a ditch[,]" Plaintiff argues that reference to the
Epperson ditch should not be given effect because such language does not appear in Plaintiffs
subsequent deed. However, in making this argument, Plaintiff fails to consider the notice
attributed to him as a result of Defendants' prior recorded deed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-3102(1). The undisputed evidence before the Court establishes that the Epperson ditch served as
the boundary separating the two tracts of property in excess of twenty years and Defendants made
use of the property throughout that period of time. Moreover, Defendants recorded a warranty
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deed on their real property in April 1987. When Plaintiff purchased his real property in 1999, he
was on notice of the contents of Defendants' deed. The Court cannot relieve Plaintiff of his
burden to make inquiry into Defendants' claims to the disputed boundary separating the tracts of
property when he was obligated to do so. Givfih the undisputed language of Defendants'
warranty deed which makes reference to a specific monument, the court finds that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the legal interpretation of the property description.
Furthermore, Defendants are entitled to declaratory judgment and an order quieting title in
Defendants.

The Easement
Defendants seek summary judgment and an order from the Court quieting title in the
easement over Plaintiffs property referenced in the Uniform Real Estate Purchase Contract
between Defendants and Ellsworth. The contract of sale between Defendants and Ellsworth was
recorded in September 1980. Accordingly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff was, at a minimum,
put on constructive notice of the recorded contract of sale that included an express grant of an
easement to Defendants over Plaintiffs property. As Defendants have aptly pointed out, Utah
law has held that cc[w]hether or not recorded, a conveyance is valid as between the parties to it
and as against those with notice of it." Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were granted an express easement by Ellsworth.
However, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have lost their rights in the easement through non-use,
relinquishment, acquiescence, or abandonment, and through Plaintiff s adverse possession and/or
prescriptive use. On the issue of a party losing his rights in an easement, the Utah Supreme Court
has held the following:
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It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be
abandoned. However, to determine the issue of abandonment
several factors need be considered among which are whether or not
the right was acquired by prescription or grant, the extent of its use,
and the actual intent of the owner. This court has previously
recognized that a right gained by. conveyance may not be lost by
non-use alone and that an actual intent to abandon be evident.
Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977) (internal
citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court further held that an intent to abandon an easement must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. In requesting summary judgment on this issue,
Defendants allege that Plaintiff has failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact. Defendant
Jon Q. Ward has submitted two affidavits, wherein he states that he has made use of the easement
numerous times. In addition, he documents the efforts of his neighboring landowners, including
Plaintiff, to block his access to and use of the easement. One such specific incident referred to by
Jon Q. Ward is the alleged removal of a bridge connecting the two parcels of land in 1980 by
Richard Benton, a previous owner of Plaintiffs property. Jon Q. Ward also refers to a barrier,
allegedly erected by Plaintiff in 1999, which has prevented Defendants' access to the easement
from Stringtown Road.
Regarding the issue of the easement, the Court finds that there are issues of genuine fact
that must proceed to trial. In making this determination, the Court recognizes that mere non-use
of an easement will not operate to deprive a party of the rights granted by the conveyance.
However, Plaintiff has raised the possibility of abandonment of the easement. In 1980, Mr.
Benton removed the bridge across the Epperson ditch, thereby effectively precluding vehicular
access to the easement, with the possible exception of access via motorcycle, for over twenty
years. Although access to the easement via the bridge has not existed for an extended, continuous
period of time, Defendants assert that they have never abandoned their interest in the easement.
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The conduct of Defendants and the predecessor neighboring landowners relative to the easement
presents issues of fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment This issue will be heard
at trial

Remaining Causes of Action
Defendants' causes of action seeking damages for trespass to land and chattels and
permanent injunctive relief will proceed to trial, as will the issues of pre and post-judgment
interest and attorney's fees

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment is granted on the issue of quieting title to the disputed strip of property west
of the Epperson ditch in Defendants The remaining issues will be heard at trial Counsel for
Defendants is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling, submitting it to counsel for
Plaintiff for approval as to form and to the Court for execution
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